China Issues Draft Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law

On August 28, 2026, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) released the Draft Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law (中华人民共和国反跨境腐败法(草案), the Draft ACBCL) for public comment. If enacted, the Draft ACBCL would be China’s first comprehensive law addressing cross-border corruption. Although the Draft ACBCL does not define new crimes, it establishes processes for inter-agency and international cooperation in the investigation of cross-border corruption, and has the potential to affect companies’ compliance programs and the conduct of cross-border investigations. Comment on the draft is due by September 26, 2026.

Background and Context

Over the past decade, China has revised its anti-corruption framework through amendments to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL), Criminal Law, and Supervision Law. In 2011, the 8th amendment to the Criminal Law first established the crime of bribing foreign government officials and personnel of international organizations. Nevertheless, in practice, this crime was rarely charged.

The Draft ACBCL consolidates these laws, providing a framework for the investigation and prosecution of bribery of foreign officials, bribery involving Chinese officials, and other corrupt conduct with a cross-border nexus. The Draft ACBCL establishes a national working mechanism led by the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) and involving numerous government agencies, signaling a more coordinated enforcement model. The Draft ACBCL also incorporates China’s anti-sanctions laws, authorizing countermeasures in response to foreign anti-corruption measures deemed improper, and imposes compliance obligations on companies engaged in cross-border business.

Key Provisions of the Draft ACBCL

Jurisdiction (Article 3). The draft ACBCL defines “cross-border corruption” broadly to cover:

• Bribery of foreign public or international organization officials by PRC citizens or entities, including their subsidiaries
• Bribery of foreign public or international organization officials by overseas individuals or entities, including their subsidiaries, where the misconduct occurs in China
• Bribery of PRC public officials by foreign persons or entities
• Other overseas corruption by PRC citizens or entities, including embezzlement, abuse of power, dereliction of duty, rent-seeking, improper transfers of value, and similar offenses
• Corrupt conduct occurring partly or wholly abroad that produces effects in China
• The cross-border flight of individuals suspected of corrupt conduct or assets implicated in corrupt conduct

Counter-Sanctions (Article 6). If foreign countries impose discriminatory restrictions on Chinese citizens or entities under the guise of anti-corruption enforcement, Chinese regulators will take counter measures in accordance with the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and other relevant legislation.

Whistleblower Protection and Rewards (Article 17). Any organization or individual may report cross-border corruption, with confidentiality, protection, and rewards for useful information. The draft ACBCL does not, however, specify the criteria for or value of the rewards.

Duty to Cooperate (Article 18). When dealing with serious cases of cross-border corruption, government agencies may require foreign companies’ overseas headquarters to cooperate with investigations or enforcement measures. However, this article does not specify what types of cooperation the overseas entities should provide, and also does not specify whether refusing to cooperate would lead to any negative impact on the foreign companies or their Chinese subsidiaries.

Restrictions on suspects (Article 19). Personnel suspected to be involved in cross-border corruption cases may be restricted from leaving China, i.e., “exit bans.”

Blocking provision (Article 26). Foreign entities may not conduct law enforcement activities (执法活动) in China without Chinese government approval, including anti-corruption investigations. Entities and individuals in China may not provide evidence or assistance to foreign entities’ law enforcement activities without such approval. The context of Article 26 suggests this restriction primarily targets investigations conducted by foreign government agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice or the UK Serious Fraud Office.

Compliance obligations (Articles 29-34). Article 29 defines “companies engaged in cross-border business” as both PRC companies with overseas subsidiaries or investments as well as the China subsidiaries of foreign companies. Articles 30-34 require these companies to develop and maintain compliance management systems, conduct risk assessments and reporting, keep true and complete books and records, perform third-party due diligence and oversight, and provide integrity training to employees. It is also unclear whether regulators will enforce these provisions as part of an investigation into corrupt misconduct, or whether regulators will claim authority to proactively review companies’ compliance programs.

Self-reporting (Articles 31 and 43). Like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit and UK Bribery Act, the Draft ACBCL encourages companies to self-report their cross-border corrupt misconduct, and treats self-reporting as a mitigating factor. However, the Draft ACBCL does not clarify whether self-reporting is voluntary or mandatory.

Obstruction penalties (Article 44). Refusing to provide evidence, concealing or destroying evidence, or obstructing an investigation may lead to orders to correct misconduct, fines and detention by public security agencies, and/or criminal liability. It remains unclear whether these penalties would be imposed on a Chinese subsidiary if a company’s foreign headquarters refuses to cooperate with such an investigation.

Penalties for compliance failures (Article 45). Failure to carry out the compliance obligations described above (Articles 29-34) may result in the company being ordered to suspend or reorganize its business operations or the revocation of the company’s business licenses.

Key Takeaways

The Draft ACBCL is a significant development in China’s legal framework for anti-corruption, with potential implications for both compliance programs and cross-border investigations.

• China’s first consolidated cross-border anti-corruption statute. The Draft ACBCL signals a significant escalation in China’s enforcement ambitions and its efforts to address cross-border corruption through a single, dedicated framework.
• Familiar compliance architecture. Although most of the compliance obligations set forth in the draft are common in mature compliance programs, companies would still be well advised to review their China compliance programs to ensure they are in line with regulators’ expectations. 
• Remaining ambiguity. The duty to cooperate and penalties for obstruction of investigations raise questions about how they will be applied to foreign headquarters and Chinese subsidiaries, particularly if a company’s foreign headquarters decline to cooperate with a Chinese investigation. It remains unclear whether self-reporting is voluntary or mandatory under the Draft ACBCL. 

This Advisory is based on the publicly released draft text of the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law (中华人民共和国反跨境腐败法（草案）) as of August 28, 2026. The Draft ACBCL is subject to revision during the legislative process. This Advisory is for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.

If you have questions about the Draft ACBCL or its implications for your business, please reach out to the authors or any of their colleagues in Arnold & Porter’s White Collar Defense & Investigations practice group.

© Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 2026 All Rights Reserved. This Advisory is intended to be a general summary of the law and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with counsel to determine applicable legal requirements in a specific fact situation.