The End of the ATS Road? Supreme Court Limits International Human Rights Lawsuits in U.S. Courts

On June 23, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe that federal courts may not create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the 1789 statute that gives federal courts jurisdiction over tort suits by foreign nationals for violations of international law. The Court also held that the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability. Cisco is the most significant ATS ruling in years: it effectively ends modern ATS litigation that has often targeted U.S. businesses operating in high-risk jurisdictions abroad with claims based on human rights violations committed by foreign governments or third parties.

For nearly half a century, beginning with the Second Circuit’s seminal decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, foreign plaintiffs have invoked the ATS to sue hundreds of U.S. and international defendants for violations of international law abroad, such as torture, extrajudicial killing, forced labor, arbitrary detention, and forced disappearance. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court gave ATS litigation a limited stamp of approval. Although the Court held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute and creates no new causes of action beyond the limited violations of international law that were widely recognized and accepted in 1789, it allowed federal courts to recognize a narrow class of claims based on modern international law norms under two conditions: (1) the relevant international law norm must have “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations” equivalent to the 1789 norms; and (2) the judiciary must exercise its discretion narrowly (described as “vigilant doorkeeping”) to ensure that any new ATS claim does not infringe upon the executive’s foreign relations prerogatives. After Sosa, plaintiffs filed over 150 lawsuits under the ATS invoking an array of alleged modern international law norms.

Sosa’s framework was controversial from the start, and the Court has consistently narrowed the ATS in the two decades that followed. We have written extensively about the various limitations the Court has imposed on ATS suits, including that ATS claims are subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality (Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum); foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS (Jesner v. Arab Bank); and allegations of general corporate activity in the United States are not enough to establish a domestic application of the statute (Nestlé v. Doe).

In Cisco, the Court delivered what may be the final blow to modern ATS litigation. Although Cisco did not disturb the narrow historical categories of ATS claims recognized in Sosa — assaults on ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy — those categories have played little role in modern ATS litigation. The practical effect is that, after Cisco, foreign plaintiffs may no longer rely on the ATS to sue for international human rights law violations in U.S. courts. It remains to be seen how the plaintiffs’ bar will respond — including whether they will seek remedies under state law, foreign law, or federal statutes such as the TVPA, the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), or the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), each of which has its own limitations.

Background

Cisco involved allegations that members of Falun Gong, a Chinese religious movement, were persecuted by the Chinese government for their religious beliefs and that Cisco helped enable that persecution by developing surveillance technology used to identify and apprehend them. Plaintiffs sued Cisco and several executives under the ATS in a federal court in California. Plaintiffs alleged that Cisco and its executives aided and abetted violations of international law, including torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; forced labor; prolonged and arbitrary detention; crimes against humanity; extrajudicial killing; and forced disappearance. One plaintiff (a U.S. citizen who could not sue under the ATS) alleged that two Cisco executives were liable under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture. The district court dismissed the complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding that aiding-and-abetting liability was available under both the ATS and the TVPA. Other circuits had split on whether the ATS provides jurisdiction for aiding-and-abetting liability. The Trump administration filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court urging dismissal of the suit against Cisco.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Writing for the 6-3 majority on the ATS issue, Justice Barrett concluded that courts may not create new causes of action under the ATS. The Court’s reasoning rested on separation-of-powers principles and foreign-policy concerns.

ATS cases, Justice Barrett explained, “by their nature” implicate foreign policy, even when brought only against U.S. defendants. Such claims almost invariably require courts to examine allegations of serious misconduct by foreign governments and foreign officials abroad. As the Court explained, recognizing new causes of action under the ATS “would intrude on both Congress’ prerogative to provide rights of action and the power of the political branches to direct the Nation’s foreign policy.”

Second, and consistent with the Court’s recent skepticism toward implied causes of action generally, the Court emphasized that creating causes of action is a task for Congress, not the judiciary. In light of the foreign-policy implications of ATS litigation, the Court reasoned that there will always be a “sound reason” not to recognize an implied cause of action and to defer to Congress in the face of congressional silence in the ATS context. The Court also pointed to the TVPA as evidence that Congress knows how to create express causes of action for certain international human rights violations (i.e., torture and extrajudicial killing) when it chooses to do so.

The Court separately held (8-to-1) that the TVPA does not impose liability for aiding and abetting a primary violation of the statute. The TVPA creates a cause of action against an individual who, under color of foreign law, “subjects” another to torture or extrajudicial killing. The Court concluded that the TVPA’s use of the word “subjects” was not enough to create secondary liability.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Kagan, agreed with the TVPA holding but not all of the majority’s reasoning. Justice Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court has effectively overruled Sosa (without directly saying so) and improperly foreclosed claims alleging serious violations of international law.

Implications

After Cisco, the ATS is no longer available for plaintiffs to bring claims under modern international human rights norms in U.S. courts. Indeed, the effects of Cisco are already being felt. In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology Inc., the defendant has asked the Fourth Circuit to revisit a $42 million jury verdict arising from alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, arguing that Cisco bars the plaintiffs’ ATS conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories.

For U.S. companies, Cisco ends two decades of exposure to ATS claims premised on violations of international human rights law abroad. Previously, in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, the Supreme Court held that corporations may not be sued under the TVPA (which extends liability only to an “individual”). Mohamad and Cisco thus significantly narrow the federal causes of action plaintiffs have used to bring international human rights claims in the United States. Cisco, however, does not eliminate all potential human-rights-related litigation risks in U.S. courts. First, the decision did not disturb the narrow historical international law norms recognized in Sosa — assaults on ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy — although those norms have played a minimal role in modern human rights litigation. Second, plaintiffs may still bring direct liability claims under the TVPA against individual defendants for torture or extrajudicial killing or against individuals or corporations under the TVPRA, the ATA, or other federal and state-law theories where available. For example, as we mentioned in our ATA Advisory, there is a growing trend in federal courts to expand the pool of potential defendants and the scope of liability under the ATA. Plaintiffs may also seek remedies in foreign courts or pursue non-litigation strategies, including regulatory complaints, sanctions requests, export-control referrals, and public pressure campaigns.

Companies seeking guidance on these issues should contact the authors of this Advisory or their usual Arnold & Porter contact.

© Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 2026 All Rights Reserved. This Advisory is intended to be a general summary of the law and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with counsel to determine applicable legal requirements in a specific fact situation.