Supreme Court Narrows Venue for Falsification Charges

On June 11, 2026, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Abouammo v. United States that a defendant charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 with knowingly falsifying a document with intent to obstruct a federal investigation must be tried where the falsification occurred — not where the investigation was located or where the falsification was intended to have obstructive effects.

Although the Court described its holding as “discrete” and narrow, the Court did express reluctance to consider a criminal statute’s mens rea elements when determining venue. At the same time, important questions remain about how the Court’s rationale may apply to other obstruction offenses — particularly those that require actual obstruction, use, transmission, or other conduct beyond falsification itself.

Background

Ahmad Abouammo worked for Twitter (now X) in San Francisco as a Media Partnerships Manager for the Middle East and North Africa region. He onboarded influential content creators and served as a liaison to key figures in his territory. In this role, Abouammo allegedly provided to a high-level Saudi official confidential information about Saudi dissidents on the platform. In exchange, the official wired him $300,000. Around the same time, Abouammo left Twitter, moved to Seattle, and started a social-media consulting business.

A subsequent FBI investigation began in San Francisco. Two agents traveled to Seattle to interview Abouammo at his home. During the interview, Abouammo allegedly denied providing confidential information and claimed the payments were for consulting work he performed after leaving Twitter. When the agents asked for supporting documentation, he allegedly went upstairs for thirty minutes and emailed an invoice to one of them. Back in San Francisco, the agents checked the invoice metadata and found it was created during that thirty-minute window.

Abouammo was indicted in the Northern District of California for, among other offenses, falsifying a record in violation of § 1519. Under this statute, whoever “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation commits a federal crime and may be fined, imprisoned for up to 20 years, or both.

Abouammo moved to dismiss the § 1519 charge, arguing that the alleged falsification occurred in Seattle — within the Western District of Washington — and therefore venue was improper in the Northern District of California. The district court denied the motion and held that venue was also proper where the FBI investigation occurred. After a two-week trial, a jury convicted Abouammo of the § 1519 charge, as well as acting as an agent of a foreign government, conspiring to commit wire fraud and honest services fraud, wire and honest services fraud, and two counts of international money laundering. The district court again rejected Abouammo’s § 1519 venue argument post-trial.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict Abouammo of acting as an agent of a foreign government and rejected Abouammo’s argument that his convictions for money laundering and wire fraud were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. As an issue of first impression, the Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s holding that venue for Abouammo’s § 1519 charge was proper in the Northern District of California because the investigation he allegedly intended to obstruct was located there.

The Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court reversed the venue holding. Absent a specific venue-setting statute, federal courts determine venue by identifying the offense’s “essential conduct elements” — the acts a defendant must perform to violate the statute — and then asking where those acts occurred. If a crime has multiple conduct elements, venue is proper wherever any one of them occurred. But § 1519, the Court concluded, prohibits only one relevant act: falsifying a record, document, or object. Once a defendant knowingly falsifies such an item with the required intent, the offense is complete. So venue lies only where the falsification occurred, not where its effect may be felt.

In reaching this holding, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on § 1519’s mens rea requirement — that the falsification occur with the intent to obstruct. The Court noted it “has never looked to a statute’s mens rea elements in considering venue, nor would it make much sense to do so.” A knowing falsification, for example, occurs in the same place as an unknowing falsification: where the falsification happens. Likewise, a falsification undertaken with intent to obstruct an investigation occurs where the falsification occurs — not where the investigation is located.

The Court also rejected the government’s argument that § 1519 is an inchoate offense related to some other ultimate obstruction crime. If so, venue could be based on conduct that would be relevant to a separate obstruction offense, even if that conduct was not an element of § 1519 itself. The government analogized to conspiracy, where venue may be proper in a district where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred. But § 1519, the Court held, is an independent falsification offense. Although inchoate crimes are generally steps toward the commission of another crime — such as attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation — § 1519 has no specific object offense. Indeed, the Court noted, “a person can commit a § 1519 crime ... by falsifying a document with the requisite intent and then putting the document away in a drawer without ever using it to obstruct an investigation.”

Open Questions

The Abouammo Court described its holding as “discrete” and narrow because, as with most venue decisions, it turns on “the nature of the specific crime charged.” Section 1519 does not require that the falsified document “have any impact at all on an investigation,” so the only prohibited act is the falsification itself. The venue rule is therefore straightforward: venue lies where the falsification occurred.

The same cannot be said for other criminal statutes “barring actual obstruction” or requiring the use of a falsified document or record. As the Court recognized, “many” obstruction offenses require proof that the defendant actually obstructed, influenced, or impeded an investigation. Others require transmission, communication, or use of a false document. Where those acts or effects are express elements of the offense, venue may be proper where they occurred, even if that differs from where the falsification occurred. So while Abouammo forecloses reliance on mens rea to establish venue under § 1519, it leaves open how venue works when the charged offense requires successful obstruction, use of the false document, or other prohibited conduct.

We will monitor Abouammo’s impact and interpretation moving forward. Please reach out to the authors of this post or members of Arnold & Porter’s White Collar Defense & Investigations group if you have any questions about this case or related topics. 

© Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 2026 All Rights Reserved. This Blog post is intended to be a general summary of the law and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with counsel to determine applicable legal requirements in a specific fact situation.