Bounty Hunting: DOJ Launches Antitrust Whistleblower Rewards Program

On July 8, 2025, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the first-ever monetary whistleblower reward initiative specifically focused on antitrust offenses. The Whistleblower Rewards Program (the Program) — launched in coordination with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and the USPS Office of Inspector General (OIG) — provides payments to individuals who report antitrust and related crimes resulting in criminal convictions and fines of at least $1 million.¹ Eligible whistleblowers may receive up to 30% of the fine, at the Antitrust Division’s discretion.² The whistleblower reward will be paid by the USPS, which will receive a share of criminal fines from the Antitrust Division to support the Program.³

The Program is the latest DOJ effort to encourage whistleblowers to come forward to report potential corporate crimes. In August 2024, DOJ announced a Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program managed by the Criminal Division, but that program did not include antitrust offenses. The new Program expands the list of crimes subject to DOJ whistleblower awards to include antitrust offenses, and goes beyond the 2020 Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act (CAARA), which was passed during the first Trump administration and protected whistleblowers from retaliation. The Program also supplements the Antitrust Division’s longstanding Corporate Leniency Policy, which provides immunity from federal prosecution to companies and individuals that self-report their antitrust violations and meet the requirements of the policy.

The Program is similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) monetary awards program, and provides for monetary payments in addition to the anti-retaliation protections under CAARA. As outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Antitrust Division and the USPS, a potential monetary reward is available to individuals who voluntarily furnish original information about eligible criminal violations.⁴ The MOU deepens the Antitrust Division’s relationship with the USPS OIG, which is a member of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force and has collaborated with the Antitrust Division on a number of significant criminal investigations in recent years. For example, the USPS OIG has assisted Antitrust Division investigations involving online sales of DVDs,⁵ bidding for state construction contracts,⁶ and pricing of generic drugs.⁷ As these examples demonstrate, although the Program nominally covers only crimes “affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property,” we anticipate that the agencies will liberally construe whether “the Postal Service has suffered an identifiable harm,” in order to maximize the impact of the new program and incentives for whistleblowers.⁸

How Does the New Program Work?

There are several requirements governing what violations qualify for a reward, who is eligible to apply for a reward, and what type of information must be provided to the government.

Eligible Criminal Violations:⁹

• Criminal violations of Sherman Act Sections 1 and 3, which prohibit price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation.
• Criminal violations of Sherman Act Section 2, which prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize. Note, however, that not all Section 2 offenses would merit criminal prosecution.
• Federal criminal violations committed to effectuate, facilitate, or conceal Sherman Act violations, or “targeting or affecting the conduct of federal competition investigations or proceedings.”¹⁰
• Federal criminal violations targeting or affecting public procurement (federal, state, or local), not limited to Sherman Act violations.
• In addition, the whistleblower must be able to reasonably articulate how the violation affects “the Postal Service, its revenues, or property,” but “the harm need not be material or otherwise pose any substantial detriment to the Postal Service.”¹¹

Whistleblower Eligibility:¹² The program is not available for individuals who:

• Coerced others to participate in or were the leaders/originators of the illegal activity.
• Are (or were at the time of acquiring the information) DOJ, USPS, or law enforcement officials.¹³

Nature of Information Disclosed to the Government: The information provided by a whistleblower to the Antitrust Division or USPS must be:

Voluntary¹⁴

• Provided before any formal demand (e.g., grand jury subpoena) compelling the same information or testimony.
• Provided under no pre-existing obligation to report the information,¹⁵ including as part of an employer’s application to the Corporate Leniency Policy.

Original¹⁶

• Derived from independent knowledge based on factual information not obtained from publicly available sources.
• Not already known to the Antitrust Division, USPS, or USPS OIG.
• Not exclusively based on judicial proceedings, government reports or hearings, or media.

Source of Information Disclosed to the Government:¹⁷ The program is not open to information that was:

• Obtained via legal representation or privileged communications, including any third parties’ attorney-client privilege (except as subject to the crime-fraud exception or other state attorney conduct rule exceptions).
• Obtained through the company’s compliance process or audit functions.¹⁸
• Obtained by an officer, director, trustee, or partner from another person informing them of misconduct allegations, or in connection with internal reviews.
• Obtained in a manner that violates federal or state criminal law.

However, there are notable exceptions that allow individuals who are officers, directors, compliance and audit personnel, trustees, and partners, to obtain an award including:

• If the individual has a reasonable belief that disclosure is necessary to:
  • Prevent criminal conduct that is likely to harm national security, result in crimes of violence, imminent financial or physical harm, or imminent harm to patients in healthcare.
  • Prevent conduct that will impede an investigation.
• If the individual reports internally and waits 120 days to report to the DOJ or obtains the information in circumstances that suggest that certain individuals in leadership already know of the potential misconduct.

In addition to the eligibility requirements, the MOU also lists 10 criteria for determining the size of the whistleblower reward.¹⁹

Takeaways

The Antitrust Division’s Whistleblower Rewards Program increases the likelihood that antitrust and related offenses will be discovered and pursued by the government. Historically, the Antitrust Division has promoted self-reporting through its Corporate Leniency Policy, which continues to provide immunity protections for eligible companies and individuals. But the leniency policy provides incentives only to those with potential criminal exposure, and does not necessarily provide incentives to individuals who may be aware of an antitrust offense but have no reason to fear prosecution. Subject to the requirements discussed above, the new Program gives such individuals monetary incentives to report wrongdoing.

Given the heightened risk that antitrust crimes will be detected and prosecuted, companies should reinvest in their antitrust compliance programs to: (1) educate employees on how to spot and avoid risky conduct; (2) implement and communicate internal channels for reporting potential violations and conduct periodic testing to ensure such channels are properly operating; (3) monitor and audit relevant areas of the business to detect potential violations promptly; (4) conduct anti-retaliation training at levels of management and at the Board of Directors to ensure compliance and reduce the risk of retaliation allegations; and (5) ensure proper carve-outs in agreements that contain nondisclosure and confidentiality provisions that allow reporting to government agencies. When implementing compliance measures, compliance departments should review the Antitrust Division’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations. Such measures will help companies detect antitrust misconduct before any whistleblower report, if not prevent the misconduct in the first place.

Notably, the program permits a reward even where the whistleblower’s information was initially reported to their employer as long as (1) the employer later reports the violation to the Antitrust Division (typically under the Corporate Leniency Policy), and (2) the whistleblower reports the information to the Antitrust Division within 120 days of their internal report or termination from the company. As a result, a company may still earn immunity under the Corporate Leniency Policy even where a whistleblower has reported the conduct to the Antitrust Division, but the company must have compliance processes that enable it to act promptly upon receiving an internal whistleblower report. Companies considering a leniency application should consult with experienced counsel regarding the benefits and consequences of that step.

Given the monetary incentives that mirror the SEC’s successful award program, which has paid out over $2.2 billion in whistleblower awards over the past decade, and given the rise of experienced counsel representing whistleblowers, it is increasingly likely that potential violations will be reported to the government. Our cross-practice team stands ready to assist clients with issues relating to antitrust compliance, internal investigations, and government investigations, including those that may arise from whistleblowers. Please reach out to any author of this Advisory or your regular Arnold & Porter contact for more information on how to mitigate risks resulting from the Antitrust Division’s announcement.

© Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 2025 All Rights Reserved. This Advisory is intended to be a general summary of the law and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with counsel to determine applicable legal requirements in a specific fact situation.