DOJ Declines to Prosecute Universities Space Research Association for Export Control Violations

On April 30, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Security Division (NSD) announced that it has declined to prosecute Universities Space Research Association (USRA) for violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the False Claims Act, and false statements, wire fraud, and obstruction of justice statutes, following USRA’s voluntary disclosure. This is the NSD’s second-ever corporate declination under the NSD Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations.

According to the declination letter and press release, the case involved a former USRA program administrator, Jonathan Soong, who facilitated the export of U.S. Army-developed aviation software to Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (Beihang), an entity identified on the Entity List, without a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Soong did not perform due diligence on prospective purchasers; instead, Soong sought to hide the true nature of the export by using an intermediary. An inquiry from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration about USRA’s software licensing activities in China prompted USRA’s investigation. When USRA started its investigation, Soong “lied and fabricated evidence that he had conducted due diligence on the purchasers.” Soong pleaded guilty to a willful violation of the EAR and was sentenced to 20 months in prison on May 3, 2023.

In declining prosecution of USRA, DOJ cited multiple factors, including USRA’s (1) “timely and voluntary” disclosure, which occurred less than three months after outside counsel had been retained, within days of Soong’s admission of wrongdoing to outside counsel, and before the internal investigation was completed; (2) full, exceptional, and proactive cooperation with the DOJ, especially with regard to document preservation and collection; and (3) timely and appropriate remediation, including by terminating Soong’s employment, disciplining his supervisor for failing to properly supervise him, improving internal controls, and making restitution. In addition, DOJ noted that there were only four unlicensed software exports and that the underlying software was designated EAR99 (which is subject to the lowest level of export controls under the EAR). Finally, DOJ concluded that USRA did not unlawfully gain from any of the above offenses.

DOJ’s recent decision to decline prosecution of USRA highlights a continued emphasis on voluntary self-disclosures and cooperation. Acting U.S. Attorney Patrick D. Robbins for the Northern District of California stated, “What the company did next made all the difference in the government’s decision not to prosecute it: the company took swift and proactive measures to disclose the employee’s wrongdoing, provide all known facts, and cooperate — and continue to cooperate — with the government’s investigation.” Companies should also take note of the continued importance of maintaining robust internal controls. In addition to preventing potential violations, robust internal controls can also help companies promptly detect and investigate potential violations and take appropriate mitigation measures.

For questions about this declination letter or other export controls or sanctions matters, contact the authors or any of their colleagues in Arnold & Porter’s White Collar Defense & Investigations or Export Control & Sanctions practice groups.

© Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 2025 All Rights Reserved. This Blog post is intended to be a general summary of the law and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with counsel to determine applicable legal requirements in a specific fact situation.