Turning a New Page on Corporate Enforcement? DOJ Criminal Division Head Announces White-Collar Enforcement Plan

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is “turning a new page on white-collar and corporate enforcement,” according to DOJ Criminal Division Head, Matthew Galeotti. In remarks made at this week’s SIFMA Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference, Galeotti announced a white-collar enforcement plan that includes changes to DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) Policy, monitor selection policy, and corporate whistleblower awards program.

Galeotti also highlighted “priority areas” for the Criminal Division, including healthcare, procurement, and federal program fraud; trade, tariff, and customs fraud; elder fraud, securities fraud, and other market manipulation schemes; federal immigration law violations; sanctions violations; material support of foreign terrorist organizations; and facilitation of cartels and transnational criminal organizations.

Along with his speech, Galeotti issued a memorandum, titled “Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime,” that provides more detail on how the Criminal Division intends to encourage voluntary self-disclosures, limit the use of monitors, and swiftly investigate “the most culpable actors.” As might be expected, some of these changes are more significant than others.

Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP): Like the Biden-era DOJ, Trump’s DOJ continues to promote voluntary self-disclosure as the “key to receiving the most generous benefits the Criminal Division can offer.” Under the CEP revisions announced this week, absent “aggravating circumstances,” companies that voluntarily self-disclose, fully cooperate with DOJ, and appropriately remediate misconduct now will receive a declination of prosecution, not just a presumption of a declination. This, in theory, may provide more certainty to companies that self-report misconduct to DOJ. But it still does not guarantee that a company will avoid prosecution: DOJ remains the arbiter of whether a VSD is timely, whether cooperation is full, and whether remediation is satisfactory. DOJ also retains the discretion to deny a declination when certain “aggravating circumstances are present,” such as the pervasiveness or severity of the wrongdoing, or a recent criminal resolution.

As another carrot, the revised CEP further provides that, in the case of a “near miss” voluntary self-disclosure — such as where a company did not disclose quickly enough, where DOJ was already aware of the misconduct, or where aggravating factors are present — a company may be eligible for a non-prosecution agreement with a term of less than three years, a 75% reduction of the criminal fine, and no compliance monitor.

Monitor Selection Policy: The Criminal Division is revising its monitor selection policy to narrowly tailor — i.e., limit but not eliminate — using outside compliance monitors. According to Galeotti, “monitors can create an adversarial relationship with the companies they monitor, impose significant expense, stray from their core mission, and unduly interfere with business.”

The guiding principle of the revised monitor policy is that the benefits of the monitor should outweigh its costs, in terms of both monetary costs and the burdens on a company’s operations. Under the revised policy, prosecutors must consider the following factors when determining whether to impose a monitor: (1) the risk of recurrence of criminal conduct that significantly impacts U.S. interests, particularly national security interests; (2) the availability and efficacy of other independent government oversight; (3) the efficacy of the compliance program and culture of compliance at the time of the resolution; and (4) the maturity of the company’s controls and its ability to independently test and update its compliance program.

If a monitor is imposed, the monitorship must be tailored appropriately to be proportionate with the severity of the misconduct and the company’s size and risk profile; to foster cooperation and collaboration between the monitor, company, and DOJ; and to allow for meetings between the company, monitor, and DOJ to mitigate against monitor overreach and ensure appropriate DOJ oversight.

Corporate Whistleblower Program: DOJ amended its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program to reflect additional priority areas of focus, including violations by corporations related to international cartels and transnational criminal organizations; federal immigration law; material support of terrorism; sanctions violations; trade, tariffs, and customs fraud; and corporate procurement fraud. Expanding the rewards program signals that DOJ is continuing to embrace whistleblowers as sources of corporate cases.

Takeaways

It is no surprise that with a new administration comes new law enforcement priorities and approaches to corporate crime. The Criminal Division appears to be signaling a lighter touch toward corporate enforcement, at least in some substantive areas and/or when companies voluntarily self-disclose misconduct. At the same time, corporate enforcement may pick up in the new administration’s priority areas such as healthcare fraud, customs fraud, securities fraud and other market manipulations schemes that impact consumers, immigration, sanctions, and the manufacture, distribution, and financing of illegal drugs. This week’s memorandum from Galeotti also makes repeated references to China, suggesting an increased focus on securities fraud, money laundering, and other federal criminal violations involving Chinese organizations.

Indeed, priority areas may see not only increased volume but also a faster pace in corporate enforcement actions. Emphasizing “efficiency in all corporate investigations,” Galeotti instructs prosecutors “to ensure that bad actors are brought to justice swiftly.” Whether and how this will play out in investigations remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, keep in mind that today’s enforcement priorities may not be tomorrow’s. Laws that were more actively enforced by the previous administration (such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)) are still on the books and generally have five-year statutes of limitations. Notwithstanding certain directives from President Trump and Attorney General Pam Bondi that revise DOJ’s priorities for criminal enforcement of the FCPA and FARA, this week’s memorandum from Galeotti identifies among 10 “high-impact” priority areas “[b]ribery and associated money laundering that impact U.S. national interests, undermine U.S. national security, harm the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, and enrich foreign corrupt officials.”

Also on the Criminal Division’s top-ten list is “crimes (1) involving digital assets that victimize investors and consumers; (2) that use digital assets in furtherance of other criminal conduct; and (3) willful violations that facilitate significant criminal activity.” So while law enforcement with respect to digital assets may be down, it is not out.

We’ll be closely following implementation of DOJ Criminal Division’s white-collar enforcement plan here on Enforcement Edge. For questions about this topic, contact the authors or any of their colleagues in Arnold & Porter’s White Collar Defense & Investigations practice group.

© Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 2025 All Rights Reserved. This Blog post is intended to be a general summary of the law and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with counsel to determine applicable legal requirements in a specific fact situation.